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Abstract
This paper extends a rewriting approximations-based theoretical framework in which the security problem
 secrecy preservation against an active intruder  may be semi-decided through a reachability verication.
In a recent paper, we have shown how to semi-decide whether a security protocol using algebraic properties
of cryptographic primitives is safe. In this paper, we investigate the dual - insecurity - problem: we explain
how to semi-decide whether a protocol using cryptographic primitive algebraic properties is unsafe. The
main advantage of our work is that the approximation functions make it possible to automatically verify
security protocols with an arbitrary number of sessions. Furthermore, our approach is supported by the tool
TA4SP successfully applied for analysing the NSPK-xor protocol and the Die-Hellman protocol.
Keywords: Security protocol, algebraic properties, automatic approximation.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are part of systems for which the security problem is in general
undecidable. Approximations and abstractions represent a well-suited alternative for
verifying them in practice. A lot of investigations have been carried out on this topic
[2,11,6,14,16,19,15,18].
An often encountered diculty is about encoding with non-atomic keys. A non-
atomic key is a key established in several steps from several data. This topic comes
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close to the handling of operators with algebraic properties. On a strongly typed
model (model in which the structure of a compound key is clearly specied), most
of the developed methods are able to perform a protocol analysis. Unfortunately a
secure strongly typed model is not a secure model because of type confusing attacks.
That is why our previous contribution [4] has extended the verication method
in [3] in order to verify  without typing  security protocols bringing into play
operators with algebraic properties. This improvement has made the computation
of sound over-approximations of the intruder knowledge possible. Consequently, the
safety, i.e., the secrecy preservation on protocols using algebraic properties of the
exclusive or (xor) operator or the exponential (exp) operator can be established
automatically. However, there is a lack of the attack detection, i.e. of showing that
a protocol is unsafe.
The main contribution of this paper consists of showing the feasibility of the
automatic unsafety verication for protocols when 1) the number of sessions is un-
bounded, and 2) the cryptographic primitives use algebraic operators properties.
We propose sucient conditions on term rewriting systems (TRSs for short), under
which attack detection on such protocols becomes possible.
To illustrate the contributions, experiments on the detection of attacks against
protocols with the primitives using xor or exp (xored and exped protocols, for short),
are reported.
Structure of the paper The paper is organised as follows. After giving prelim-
inary notions on tree automata and TRSs, we introduce in Section 2 a substitution
depending on rules of a TRS, and a notion of compatibility between such substitu-
tions and nite tree automata, both suitable for reachability analysis in rewriting
with non left-linear TRSs. In Section 3, we present the extension of [4] dealing
with under-approximations. Finally, before concluding, we give in Section 4 a brief
overview of related works, and we explain how to apply the obtained new results to
analyse xored or exped protocols.
2 Background and Notations
In this section basic notions on nite tree automata, term rewriting systems and
approximations are recalled. The reader is referred to [8] for more detail.
2.1 Notations
Given the set N of natural integers, N
∗
denotes the nite strings over N. Let F be a
nite set of symbols with their arities. The set of symbols of F of arity i is denoted
Fi. Let X be a nite set whose elements are variables. We assume that X ∩ F = ∅.
A nite ordered tree t over a set of labels (F ,X ) is a function from a prex-closed set
Pos(t) ⊆ N∗ to F ∪ X . A term t over F ∪ X is a labeled tree whose domain Pos(t)
satises the following properties: Pos(t) is non-empty and prex closed, for each
p ∈ Pos(t), if t(p) ∈ Fn (with n 6= 0), then {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} = {1, . . . , n} and, for
each p ∈ Pos(t), if t(p) ∈ X or t(p) ∈ F0, then {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} = ∅. Each element
of Pos(t) is called a position of t. For each subset K of X ∪ F and each term t we
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denote by PosK(t) the subset of positions p's of t such that t(p) ∈ K. Each position p
of t such that t(p) ∈ F , is called a functional position. The set of terms over (F ,X )
is denoted T (F ,X ). A ground term is a term t such that Pos(t) = PosF (t) (i.e.
such that PosX (t) = ∅). The set of ground terms is denoted T (F). A subterm t|p
of t ∈ T (F ,X ) at position p is dened by: Pos(t|p) = {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} and, For all
j ∈ Pos(t|p), t|p(j) = t(p.j). We denote by t[s]p the term obtained by replacing in t
the subterm t|p by s. See Example 6.1.
For all sets A and B, we denote by Σ(A,B) the set of functions from A to B. If
σ ∈ Σ(X , B), then for each term t ∈ T (F ,X ), we denote by tσ the term obtained
from t by replacing for each x ∈ X , the variable x by σ(x). A term rewriting system
R over T (F ,X ) is a nite set of pairs (l, r) from T (F ,X )× T (F ,X ), denoted l→r,
such that the set of variables occurring in r is included in the set of variables of l.
A TRS is left-linear if for each rule l→r, every variable occur at most once in l. For
each ground term t, we denote by R(t) the set of ground terms t
′
such that there
exist a rule l → r of R, a function µ ∈ Σ(X ,T (F)) and a position p of t satisfying
t|p = lµ and t
′
= t[rµ]p. The relation {(t, t
′
) | t
′
∈ R(t)} is classically denoted →R.
If t→Rt
′
for t, t′ ∈ T (F), then t is a rewriting predecessor of t′ and t′ is rewriting
successor of t. For each set of ground terms B we denote by R∗(B) the set of ground
terms related to an element of B modulo the reexive-transitive closure of →R.
A tree automaton A is a tuple (Q,∆, F ), where Q is the set of states, ∆ the
set of transitions, and F the set of nal states. Transitions are rewriting rules of
the form f(q1, . . . , qk)→q, where f ∈ Fk and the qi's are in Q. A term t ∈ T (F)
is accepted or recognised by A if there exists q ∈ F such that t→∗∆q (we also write
t→∗Aq). The set of terms accepted by A is denoted L(A). For each state q ∈ Q, we
write L(A, q) for the tree language L((Q,∆, {q})). A tree automaton is nite if its
set of transitions is nite. See Example 6.2.
In [4], a new kind of substitution has been introduced. We recall this denition
below. Notice that the domain of these substitutions is not the set of variables
anymore, but a set of positions. Thus, given a variable, this allows a symbolic
representation of its values.
Denition 2.1 Let R be a term rewriting system, Q a set of states and l→ r ∈ R.
A (l → r)-substitution is an application from PosX (l) into Q.
We then adapt this kind of substitution to the rewriting framework in the fol-
lowing way. Let l→r ∈ R and σ be a (l→ r)-substitution. We denote by lσ the
term of T (F ,Q) such that Pos(lσ) = Pos(l), and for each p ∈ Pos(l), if p ∈ PosX (l)
then lσ(p) = σ(l(p)), otherwise lσ(p) = l(p). Similarly, we denote by rσ the term
of T (F ,Q) dened by: Pos(rσ) = Pos(r) and, for each p ∈ Pos(r), if p /∈ PosX (r)
then rσ(p) = r(p) and rσ(p) = σ(l(p
′
)) otherwise, where p
′
= minPosr(p)(l) (posi-
tions are lexicographically ordered). For a given tree automaton, a particular class
of (l → r)-substitution can be drawn.
Denition 2.2 Let A be a nite tree automaton. We say that a (l→ r)-substitution
σ is A-compatible if for each x ∈ Var(l),
⋂
p∈Pos{x}(l)
L(A, σ(p)) 6= ∅.
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See Example 6.3. Finally, the last notion we introduce is the denition of an
approximation function.
Denition 2.3 Let A be a nite tree automaton. An approximation function (for
A) is a function associating with each tuple (l→ r, σ, q), where l→ r ∈ R, σ is an
A-compatible (l→ r)-substitution and q a state of A, a mapping from Pos(r) to Q.
See Example 6.4. This notion is very useful for reachability analysis in rewriting
with non left-linear TRSs as shown in the following section.
2.2 Reachability Analysis in Rewriting with non Left-linear TRSs
This section recalls the approximation-based framework we have been developing,
and explains our objectives from a formal point of view.
Given a tree automaton A and a TRS R (for several classes of automata and
TRSs), the tree automata completion [14,13] algorithm computes a tree automaton
Ak such that L(Ak) = R
∗(L(A)) when it is possible (for the classes of TRSs covered
by this algorithm see [13]), and such that L(Ak) ⊇ R
∗(L(A)) otherwise.
The tree automata completion works as follows. From A = A0 completion builds
a sequence A0,A1, . . . ,Ak of automata such that if s ∈ L(Ai) and s→Rt then t ∈
L(Ai+1). If there is a x-point automaton Ak such that R
∗(L(Ak)) = L(Ak), then
one has L(Ak) = R
∗(L(A0)) (or L(Ak) ⊇ R
∗(L(A)) if R is not in one class of [13]).
In particular, for non left-linear TRSs, the completion is not sound. Indeed, if the
completion converges towards a x-point automaton Ak, L(Ak) is not necessarily
either R∗(L(A)) or a super set of R∗(L(A)).
In [4], the completion procedure has been improved so that the method is sound
for non left-linear TRSs. This technique is introduced below. As mentioned previ-
ously, the completion builds a sequence A0,A1, . . . ,Ak of tree automata such that
the set of terms reachable in one step of rewriting from L(Ai) are in L(Ai+1). To
build Ai+1 from Ai, we achieve a completion step which consists of nding critical
pairs between →R and →Ai . Formally, for an approximation function γ, a rule
l→r ∈ R and an Ai-compatible (l → r)-substitution σ, a critical pair is an instance
lσ of l such that there exists q ∈ Q satisfying lσ→∗Aiq and rσ 6 →
∗
Ai
q. For every
critical pair, such that lσ→∗Aiq and rσ 6 →
∗
Ai
q, detected between R and Ai, Ai+1 is
built by adding new transitions to Ai, so that it recognizes rσ in q, i.e. rσ→Ai+1q.
lσ
Ai
R
rσ
q
∗
Ai+1
∗
Before giving a denition of a completion step (Def. 2.5), we introduce a normalisa-
tion step described in Denition 2.4 .
Let's remark that the transition rσ→q is not necessarily a transition of the
form f(q1, . . . , qn)→q
′
and so has to be normalized rst. For example, to nor-
malize a transition of the form f(g(a), h(q′))→q, we need to nd some states
q1, q2, q3 and replace the previous transition by a set of normalized transitions:
{a→q1, g(q1)→q2, h(q
′)→q3, f(q2, q3)→q}. The states used in a normalization step
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do not grow on trees and it is of the approximation function γ concern to deliver
them at each completion step. Formally,
Denition 2.4 Let A = (Q0,∆, F0) be a nite tree automaton, γ be an approxima-
tion function for A, l→ r be a rule of R, σ be an A-compatible (l → r)-substitution,
and q be a state of A. We denote by Normγ(l→ r, σ, q) the following set of transi-
tions, called normalization of (l→ r, σ, q):
{f(q1, . . . , qk)→q
′
|p ∈ PosF (r), r(p) = f,
q
′
= q if p = ε otherwise q
′
= γ(l → r, σ, q)(p)
qi = γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.i) if p.i /∈ PosX (r),
qi = σ(min{p
′
∈ PosX (l) | l(p
′
) = r(p.i)})otherwise}
The min is computed for the lexical order.
Notice that the set {p
′
∈ PosX (l) | l(p
′
) = r(p.i)} used in the above denition
is not empty. Indeed, in a TRS, variables occurring in the right-hand side must, by
denition, occur in the left-hand side too.
Denition 2.5 Let R be a TRS. Let A0 = (Q0,∆0, F0) be a nite tree automaton
and γ an approximation function for A0. The automaton Cγ(A0) = (Q1,∆1, F1) is
dened by:
∆1 = ∆0 ∪
⋃
Normγ(l → r, σ, q)
where the union involves all rules l→ r ∈ R, all states q ∈ Q0, all A0-compatible
(l → r)-substitutions σ such that lσ→∗A0q and rσ 6 →
∗
A0
q, F1 = F0 and Q1 =
Q0 ∪ Q2, where Q2 denotes the set of states occurring in left/right-hand sides of
transitions of ∆1.
See Example 6.5 for an example of a completion step. Following theorem was
proved in [4].
Theorem 2.6 Let (An) and (γn) be respectively a sequence of nite tree automata
and a sequence of approximation functions such that for each integer n, γn is an
approximation function for An and An+1 = Cγn(An). If there exists a positive integer
N , such that for every n ≥ N , An = AN , then R
∗(L(A0)) ⊆ L(AN ).
From a verication point of view, this technique is very helpful. Indeed, for a
system Σ whose transition relation is ∆, one species the initial conguration of
Σ by a tree language E, and ∆ by a TRS R. With a well-suited approximation
function γ, an over-approximation of reachable congurations of Σ, denoted EγR, can
be computed. Finally, a set of bad congurations, denoted EBad, can be encoded with
a tree language and if EγR ∩EBad is empty, then no bad conguration is reachable.
In particular, in [4], we have used this technique for verifying security protocols
bringing into play the xor operator (⊕). Note that the nilpotence property of ⊕ is
specied with a non left-linear rule, i.e., x ⊕ x→0. The tree languages specify the
intruder knowledge and the congurations of the network. The TRS species the
protocol and the intruder abilities for decoding, coding, depairing messages. Thus,
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if a secret term t does not belong to an over-approximation of the knowledge that
the intruder might have, then t is actually secret.
3 Under-Approximations for non Left-linear TRSs
The over-approximation results in [4] do not provide a way to prove that a particular
term is reachable: the method is not complete. This section adapts the means and
extends the results in [4] to under-approximations computations. In the security
protocol framework, computing under-approximations allows an under-estimation of
the intruder knowledge, and thus secrecy aws detection. Indeed, if a secret datum
is in the intruder knowledge under-estimation, then the intruder actually knows this
secret.
The main idea (and problem) behind the under-approximations is that one wants
the languages of computed tree automata to be in the set of terms reachable by
rewriting . Having some conditions on the TRS makes it possible to control the
completion, and proving that a term is actually reachable is then possible.
We dene here γ to be an injective approximation function from R × (N∗ 7→
Q)×N∗×Q into Q. Theorem 3.2 shows that with such an approximation function,
an under-approximation of the set of reachable terms is possible. Before, Lemma
3.1 presents an intermediary result useful for proving Theorem 3.2: this result re-
veals some features of terms recognised by Cγ(A) for which there exists a rewriting
predecessor recognised by A.
In the following, we introduce the notation NLV (t) which for a term t of T (F ,X ),
denotes the set of non-linear variables of t, i.e., the set of variables occurring at least
twice within t.
Lemma 3.1 Let R be a right-linear TRS for which NLV (l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅ for all
l→r ∈ R. Let A be the current tree automaton and Cγ(A) be the tree automaton
obtained after one completion step with R and γ. If there exist a ground term t over
F , a state q of A and a function τ from Pos(t) to Q such that t ∈ L(Cγ(A), q), t 6∈
L(A, q) and τ satises the following conditions: (i) τ(ε) = q; (ii) for all p ∈ Pos(t),
t|p ∈ L(Cγ(A), τ(p)) and, (iii) for all p ∈ Pos(t) \ {ε}, if τ(p) is a state of A, then
t|p ∈ L(A, τ(p)). Then there exists t0 ∈ T (F) such that t0 ∈ L(A, q) and t0→Rt.
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is in Appendix 8.1.
The following result shows that each term of the language Cγ(A0) is reachable by
rewriting from A0 and using R.
Theorem 3.2 Let A0 = (Q0,∆0, F0) be a nite tree automaton. Let R be a right-
linear TRS. Given the approximation function γ dened at the beginning of Section
3, if for all l→r ∈ R, Var(r) ∩NLV (l) = ∅ then L(Cγ(A0)) ⊆ R
∗(L(A0)).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in Appendix 8.2. Let C
(n)
γ (A0) be the
tree automaton obtained after n completion steps performed from A0 by using the
TRS R and the approximation function γ. Finally, Proposition 3.3 shows that the
approximation function γ provides a sound under-approximation of reachable terms
(see Appendix 8.3 for the proof).
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Proposition 3.3 If R is right-linear and for all l→r ∈ R, NLV (l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅
then for all n ≤ 0, L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆ R
∗(L(A0)), L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆ L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)) and⋃
n≥0L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) = R
∗(L(A0)).
At this point, we have developed theoretical frameworks which lead either to
over-approximations of the set of reachable terms in general, or to its under-
approximations under additional conditions on TRSs. The obtained results allow
us to apply the approximation-based methods to system verication as presented in
the next section.
4 Experiments and Related Works
With the extension brought for the under-approximations computation, we are now
able to detect whether a protocol using algebraic properties of cryptographic primi-
tives is awed or not. In this section, we present some experimental results obtained
on two protocols, well-known to be awed, which are NSPK-xor and the key estab-
lishment à la Die-Helmann protocol. The technique presented in this paper has
been implemented in the tool TA4SP (a description of the tool is given in Appendix 9).
4.1 TA4SP for Attack Detection
This section details two protocols, well-known to be awed, which are NSPK-xor
and the key establishment à la Die-Helmann protocol in its simplest form. The
notations used are the following: X -> Y: Z species that X sends the message Z to
Y, X.Y is the concatenation of data X and Y, and {X}
Y
(or {X}_Y) is the encoding of
the message X by the message Y. Moreover, data Na, Nb, ni(Na) and ni(Nb) with i
being an integer, are fresh random numbers, also called a nonces. Finally, the last
concept to know concerns the keys, which can be public, private or symmetric. To
a public key Pka is associated a private key Prka. A message encoded by one can
be decoded by the other: {{M}
Pka
}
Prka
= {{M}
Prka
}
Pka
= M. A symmetric key K can
decode a message encoded by itself: {{M}
K
}
K
= M.
The NSPK-xor Protocol is composed of three steps so that each participant
can authenticate the other. First, the agent A sends the message {Na.A}KB to the
agent B. Second, B sends {Nb.Na ⊕ B}KA to A. Finally, A sends {Nb}KB to B
as a conrmation. Using TA4SP, we obtain in 71.03 seconds that the protocol does
not preserve the secrecy of the data Nb against an intruder. Thanks to the AVISPA
toolset, one can use one of three other tools (in this case CL-AtSe [20]) for exhibiting
the following attack trace.
1. i -> (a,6): start
2. (a,6) -> i: {n9(Na).a}_ki
3. i -> (a,3): start
4. (a,3) -> i: {n1(Na).a}_kb
5. i -> (b,4): {xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na))).a}_kb
6. (b,4) -> i: {n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na))}_ka
& Secret(n5(Nb),set_62);
& Add a to set_62; Add b to set_62;
7. i -> (a,6): {n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na))}_ka
8. (a,6) -> i: {n5(Nb)}_ki
7
Boichut, Ham and Kouchnarenko.
At steps 1. and 2. of the attack, the agent a initiates a session with the in-
truder by sending the message {n9(Na).a}_ki to the intruder where n9(Na) is a
nonce generated by a and ki is the public key of the intruder. At steps 3. and
4., the agent a initiates a session with the agent b. The intruder composes at step
5. the message xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na))).a and sends it to b after having encoded
it with the public key of the agent b. The agent b deduces at step 6. that this
message comes from the agent a thanks to the identity occurring in the received
message. Moreover, b considers the message xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na)))' as the nonce gen-
erated by a. Consequently, b performs the second step of the protocol. At step
6. of the attack trace, b composes n5(Nb).xor(b,xor(i,xor(b,n9(Na)))) which
is equivalent to n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na)) after considering the algebraic properties of
⊕ (xor operator). Then, he sends it to a after having encoded it with the public
key of a. The agent b declares also the nonce n5(Nb) as a secret shared between
himself and the agent a. But, according to the point of view of the agent a, the
message {n5(Nb).xor(i,n9(Na))}_ka should come from i (the intruder) because
n5(Nb) identies the agent i for a. According to his deduction, the agent a sends
{n5(Nb)}_ki to the intruder. Finally, the latter can deduce n5(Nb) which is a secret
supposed to be shared between b and a.
The Die-Helmann Protocol is a key establishment protocol between two
agents A and B. The simplest version of this protocol is composed of three steps.
At step 1, A generates the nonce Na and computes exp(G,Na) (standing for GNa)
where G is a number known by every agents. Thus A sends the message exp(G,Na)
to the agent B. At step 2, the agent B generates also a number Nb and computes
on the one hand exp(G,Nb) and on the other hand K = exp(X,Nb) where X is
the message received i.e. exp(G,Na). The former is sent to A and the latter stands
for the symmetric key shared between A and B. As soon as B receives the message
exp(G,Nb) from A, (s)he then computes exp(exp(G,Nb), Na) and thus considers it
as the symmetric key shared with A. Indeed, according to the algebraic properties
of the exponentiation, K = exp(exp(G,Na), Nb) = exp(exp(G,Nb), Na). Finally,
the message {secret}K is sent by A to B in which secret is a datum initially known
uniquely by A and B. Using TA4SP this protocol has been shown as being awed in
24.73 seconds. For this protocol, a MIM (Man in the Middle) attack is known and
is detailed below with the attack trace outputted with the AVISPA tool-set.
1. i -> (a,3): start
2. (a,3) -> i: exp(g,n1(Na))
3. i -> (b,4): g
4. (b,4) -> i: exp(g,n5(Nb))
5. i -> (a,3): g
6. (a,3) -> i: {secab}_(exp(g,n1(Na)))
7. i -> (b,4): {secab}_(exp(g,n5(Nb)))
8. (b,4) -> i: ()
& Secret(exp(g,n5(Nb)),set_65); Add a to set_65;
& Add b to set_65;
Roughly, the intruder establishes two keys: exp(exp(g,n1(Na)),g) with a at
steps 2 and 5 and exp(exp(g,n5(Nb)),g) with b at steps 3 and 4. At step 6,
the agent a sends the secret data to b with the key unfortunately shared with the
8
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intruder. The intruder then extracts the secret data and forwards it to b with the
other key. Finally, b is persuaded that this message comes from a.
4.2 Related Work
In [17] it has been shown that using equational tree automata under associativity
and/or commutativity is relevant for security problems of cryptographic protocols
with an equational property. For protocols modeled by associative-commutative
TRSs, the authors announce the possibility for the analysis to be done automatically
thanks to the tool ACTAS manipulating associative-commutative tree automata and
using approximation algorithms. However, the engine has still room to be modied
and optimised to support an automated verication.
In [10], the authors study the IBM 4758 CCA (Common Cryptographic Architec-
ture) API which has been shown as awed in [5]. In response to this aw, IBM then
has proposed three recommendations designed to prevent it. The formalisation of
these recommendations leads Cortier et al. to draw up a particular class of security
protocols using the operator ⊕ for which the secrecy problem is decidable with an
unbounded number of sessions. They have then shown that any one of the three
recommendations is sucient to secure the API against a Dolev-Yao intruder [12].
In the recent survey [9], the authors give an overview of the existing methods
in formal approaches to analyse cryptographic protocols. In the same work, a list
of some relevant algebraic properties of cryptographic operators is established, and
for each of them, the authors provide examples of protocols or attacks using these
properties. This survey lists two drawbacks with the recent results aiming at the
analysis of protocols with algebraic properties. First, in most of the papers a par-
ticular decision procedure is proposed for a particular property. Second, the authors
emphasise the fact that the results remain theoretical, and very few implementations
automatically verify protocols with algebraic properties.
5 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the symbolic approximation-based
approach we have been developing is well-adapted for detecting attacks on proto-
cols using algebraic properties while considering an unbounded number of sessions.
Indeed, the automatically generated symbolic under-approximation function enables
us 1) an automated normalisation of transitions, and 2) an automated completion
procedure within the set of reachable terms.
With this extension our approximation-based framework proposes verication
methods using either over-approximations of the set of reachable terms in general, or
its under-approximations under additional conditions on TRSs. The contributions
of the paper have been integrated into the push-button tool TA4SP [1] successfully
applied for analysing the NSPK-xor protocol and the Die-Hellman protocol. Let
us remark that TA4SP is used for protocols specied in the standard High Level
Protocol Specication Language (HLPSL) [7]. This language is known to be suitable
for industrial users.
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Future development concerns implementation optimisation. We intend to investi-
gate further algebraic properties that can be handled in practice. In this direction, we
project to develop a theoretical framework in order to compute under-approximations
without the right-linearity condition required Theorem 3.2. This may for example
provide an approximation-based approach for detecting attacks on security protocols
with cryptographic primitives using the homomorphism property [9].
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Appendix
6 Basic Examples
Example 6.1 Let f, g, a ∈ F be functional symbols such that f ∈ F2, g ∈ F1 and
a ∈ F0. Let x ∈ X be a variable. Let t be a term of T (F ,X ) such that t = f(a, g(x)),
thus Pos(t) = {, 1, 2, 2.1}, PosF (t) = {, 1, 2}, t(1) = a, t(2) = g, t() = f , t|1 = a,
t|2 = g(x), t|2.1 = x, Pos{x}(t) = {2.1} and t[a]2 = f(a, a).
Example 6.2 Let A = (Q,∆, F ) be a tree automaton such that F = {f, g, a}
with f ∈ F2, g ∈ F1 and a ∈ F0, Q = {qf , q1}, F = {qf} and ∆ =
{f(q1, q1)→qf , a→q1, g(q1)→q1}. Then, L(A, q1) = {g
∗(a)} and L(A, qf ) = L(A) =
{f(g∗(a), g∗(a))}.
Example 6.3 Let Aexe = ({q0, qf},∆exe, {qf}) with the set of transitions ∆exe =
{A→q0, A→qf ,f(qf , q0)→qf , h(q0, q0)→q0}. Let Rexe = {f(x, h(x, y))→h(A,x)}.
The automaton Aexe recognizes the set of trees such that every path from the root
to a leaf is of the form f∗h∗A. Let us consider the substitution σexe dened by
σexe(1) = qf , σexe(2.1) = q0 and σexe(2.2) = q0. The tree t = A can be reduced to qf
and belongs to L(A, σexe(1)). Furthermore t→q0, so t ∈ L(A, σexe(2.1)). Therefore
σexe is A-compatible.
Example 6.4 Consider the automaton Aexe, the term rewriting system Rexe and
the substitution σexe dened in Example 6.3. For σexe, an approximation function
γexe may be dened by:
γexe(l→r, σexe, qf )(ε) = q1, γexe(l→r, σexe, qf )(1) = q0, γexe(l→r, σexe, qf )(2) = q1.
To totally dene γexe, the other (nitely many) Aexe-compatible substitutions should
be considered too.
Example 6.5 [A completion step] Following Example 6.4, ε and 1 are the func-
tional positions of r = h(A, y). We set q
′
of the denition to be equal to qf . Thus
Normγexe(l → r, σexe, qf ) is of the form {A→q?, h(q?, q??)→qf}. Since for r, the posi-
tion 1 is a functional position and 2 is in PosX (r), we use the last line of the denition
to compute q?? and q? is dened by the approximation function γexe. Finally we
obtain:
Normγexe(l → r, σexe, qf ) = {r(1)→γexe(1), r(ε)(γexe(1), σexe(1))→qf}
= {A→q0, h(q0, qf )→qf}.
Consequently, the tree automaton resulting from a completion step on Aexe with
γexe and Rexe is Cγ(Aexe) = ({q0, qf},∆exe ∪ {A→q0, h(q0, qf )→qf}, {qf}).
Notice that a new completion step could be performed on Cγ(Aexe). However, no
transition would be added since no new critical pair would be detected. So, Cγ(Aexe)
is the x-point automaton. According to Theorem 2.6, every term reachable by
rewriting from L(Aexe) are in the language of the x-point automaton.
11
Boichut, Ham and Kouchnarenko.
7 Example of a Completion Procedure
In this section we explain how our approach works on a toy example . We do not
give the details of a protocol study since involving term rewriting systems are too
huge to be readable.
We consider terms dened by
• F0 = {0},
• F1 = {Inv, s},
• F2 = {+} and
• Fk≥3 = ∅.
In this formalism, the symbol s denotes the successor function. For instance,
s(s(s(0))) is the successor of the successor of the successor of 0 and denotes the
integer 3. The operator Inv denotes the inverse (for the addition). For example,
Inv(s(0)) is the inverse of the successor of 0 and denotes the integer −1.
We use the following term rewriting system to encode addition and subtraction
over Z. To simplify notations, we write (x+ y) or x+ y for +(x, y).
R = {Inv(Inv(x))→x (1)
x→Inv(Inv(x)) (2)
x+ Inv(x)→0 (3)
x+ y→y + x (4)
x+ (y + z)→(x+ y) + z (5)
x+ 0→x (6)
x+ s(0)→s(x) (7)
s(x)→x+ s(0) (8)
Inv(s(x))→Inv(s(s(x))) + s(0)} (9)
Notice that this term rewriting system is not left-linear (Rule (7)).
We are interested in the following problem: given three integers a, b and c, are
there integers λ and µ such that
λa+ µb = c?
A basic number theory result states that the answer the previous question is yes if
and only if c is a multiple of the greatest common divisor of a and b.
For instance, it is possible for a = 7, b = 3 and c = 15 (since gcd(a, b) = 1). We
may prove it using the above term rewriting system. Indeed, from s7(0) and s3(0)
one can reach s15(0) using +, Inv and rewriting rules. For example:
s3(0)→12s
2(0) + s(0)→12(s(0) + s(0)) + s(0)
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Consequently
s3(0) + s3(0)→∗12((s(0) + s(0)) + s(0)) + s
3(0)→∗12,9s
6(0) (10)
Similarly one has
(((s7(0) + s7(0)) + s7(0))→12,9s
21(0) (11)
Moreover, from (10) one has
Inv(s3(0) + s3(0))→∗12,9Inv(s
6(0))→∗9,8Inv(s
21(0)) + s15(0)
Therefore, by (11), one has
(((s7(0)+s7(0))+s7(0))+Inv(s3(0)+s3(0))→∗8,12,9(s
21(0)+Inv(s21(0)))+s15(0)→7,10s
15(0).
Now we prove that the problem has no solution for a = 2, b = 4 and c = 5
(this is mathematically trivial, the goal is just to illustrate that it can be proved
automatically by our over-approximation approach).
We consider for initial terms the language accepted by the following tree automa-
ton A:
•
States are q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q−2 q−4 and qf ,
•
Final states are q2,q−2, q−4, q4, and qf ,
•
Transitions are
· 0→q0, s(q0)→q1, s(q1)→q2, s(q2)→q3, s(q3)→q4 (encodes that s
2(0) and s4(0)
are initially known),
· Inv(q4)→q−4 (encodes that one can compute the inverse of 4),
· Inv(q2)→q−2 (encodes that one can compute the inverse of 2),
· qf1 + qf2→qf for all nal states qf1 , qf2 , (encodes that one can do the addition
of two computed integers terms).
We want to prove that s5(0) /∈ R∗(L(A)).
We give some details on the rst completion step.
Rule (5) This rule doesn't provide new transition. Indeed, there is no state q in A such
that Inv(Inv(q)) can be derived in A to a state.
Rule (6) For each state q one has to add the normalisation of the transition Inv(Inv(q))→q.
Assume that
γ(Rule(6), {e 7→ q1}, q1)(1) = q3
. Then during the completion step, the normalisation of Inv(Inv(q1))→q1 ensures
that we add the transitions Inv(q1)→q3 and Inv(q3)→q1. With similar assumptions
on γ one adds during the rst completion step Inv(q0)→q0, Inv(q−4→q4) and
Inv(q−2)→q2.
Rule (7) Since q4 + Inv(q4)→
∗
Aqf , one has to add the transition 0→qf .
Rule (8) This rule doesn't provide new transition.
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Rule (9) This rule doesn't provide new transition.
Rule (10) This rule doesn't provide new transition.
Rule (11) This rule doesn't provide new transition.
Rule (12) Since s(q0)→Aq1 and q0 + s(0) 6 →
∗
Aq1, one has to add the following transitions
(with correct assumptions on γ) 0→q0, s(q0)→q1 (these two transitions are already
in A) and q0+q1→q1. Similarly, one has to add transitions q0+q2→q2, q0+q3→q3,
q0 + q4→q4.
Rule (12) Since Inv(s(q1))→
∗
Aq−2 and Inv(s(s(q1))+ s(0)) 6 →
∗
Aq−2, one has to add the tran-
sitions (with correct assumption on γ), s(0)→q1, s(q1)→q2, s(q2)→q3, Inv(q3)→q1,
q1 + q1→q2 and Inv(q2)→q−2.
Similar completion steps lead to the following tree automaton B:
•
States of B are q−4, q−2, q1, q2, q3, q4 and qf .
•
Final states are q2, q4, q−2, q−4 and qf .
•
Transitions on constants are 0→q0 and 0→qf .
•
Transitions with symbol s are given by the following table:
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4
s q1 q2 q3 q4 q1
For instance, s(q−2)→q3 is a transition.
•
Transitions with symbol Inv are given by the following table:
q−4 q−2 q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 qf
Inv q4 q2 q0 q3 q−2 q1 q−4 qf
•
Transitions with symbol + are given by the following table:
+ q−4 q−2 q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 qf
q−4 q−4, qf q−2, qf q−4 q1 q2, qf q3 q0, q4, qf qf
q−2 q−2, qf q0, qf q−2, qf q3 q0, q4, qf q1 q2, qf qf
q0 q−4, qf q−2, qf q0 q1 q2, qf q3 q4, qf ∅
q1 q1 q3 q1 q2, qf q3 q4, q0, qf qf ∅
q2 q2, qf q0, q4, qf q2, qf q3 q4, qf , q0 q1 q2, qf qf
q3 q3 q1 q3 q4, q0, qf q1 q2, qf q3 ∅
q4 q0, q4, qf q2, qf q4, q0, qf q1 q2, qf q3 q4, qf , q0 qf
qf qf qf ∅ ∅ qf ∅ qf qf
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The automaton B is stable by the Cγ completion. Consequently, it accepts an
over-approximation of reachable terms of A by R. Since s5(0) /∈ L(B), its proved
that we may not have λ.2 + µ.4 = 5 with λ, µ ∈ Z.
8 Omitted Proof Details
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
To simplify the notation we denote by ∆1 the set of transitions of the automaton
Cγ(A), ∆0 the set of transitions of A and Q0 the set of states of A.
The proof consists of 1) the construction of a term s1 ∈ T (F ,Q) such that
t→∗∆1s1→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)q, (12)
2) the construction, by iterating a backward process, of a term s ∈ T (F ,Q) such
that
t→∗∆1s→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q, and (13)
3) the proof that
t→∗∆0rσ→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q. (14)
First, using (ii) at the position ε gives
t|ε→
∗
∆1τ(ε).
Since t = t|ε and since τ(ε) = q (by (i)), one has
t→∗∆1q.
Since t ∈ T (F) one has t 6= q, and every derivation t→∗∆1q has the length one, at
least. Consequently, there exists s1 ∈ T (F ,Q) such that
t→∗∆1s1→∆1q.
We now show by contradiction that the transition s1→q /∈ ∆0. Suppose that
s1→q is a transition of ∆0. Then s1 ∈ T (F ,Q0). Thus, using (iii), t→
∗
∆0
s1→∆0q, a
contradiction ( t 6 →∗∆0q).
Therefore, the transition s1→q is in ∆1 \ ∆0. By denition of ∆1 (see Deni-
tion 2.5), there exist q
′
, σ : PosX(l)
∗ 7→ Q and l→r ∈ R such that s1→Cγ(A)q ∈
Normγ(rσ→q
′
, l→r) and
lσ→∗∆0q
′
. (15)
Now by denitions of Normγ(rσ→q
′
, l→r) and γ, each source state or target
state of a transition in Normγ(rσ→q
′
, l→r) is either Q \Q0, or is equal to q
′
. Since
s1→Cγ (A)q ∈ Normγ(rσ→q
′
, l→r), either q ∈ Q\Q0, or q = q
′
. Because q ∈ Q0, one
has q = q
′
and
t→∗∆1s1→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)q.
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We are done for (12). We now perform an iterative construction. If s1 /∈
T (F ,Q0), then there exists a position p of s1 such that s1(p) ∈ Q \ Q0. Thus
s1(p) is of the form s1(p) = γ(l→r, σ, q)(p). Since γ is injective, the only transition
of ∆1 leading to s1(p) is
r(p)(γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.1), . . . , γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.`))→s1(p).
Consequently, the derivation t→∗∆1s1 has to conclude by
t→∗∆1s2→s1
where
s2 = s1[r(p)(γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.1), . . . , γ(l→r, σ, q)(p.`))]p.
So, one has
t→∗∆1s2→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)s1→Normγ(l→r,σ,q)q.
Now, if s2 /∈ T (F ,Q0), the same construction can be iteratively applied to s2 and
so on. Consequently, one can build a term s ∈ T (F,Q0) such that Pos(s) = Pos(r)
and
t→∗∆1s→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q, (16)
and for each position p of s such that s(p) /∈ Q,
s(p) = r(p). (17)
We are done for (13) .
We can begin the last part of the proof. Let q1, . . . , qn be the states occurring in
s by reading s from the left to the right. Let p1, . . . , pn be respectively the positions
in s of states q1, . . . , qn. Notice that the backward construction of s is deterministic.
Indeed every derivation from t to q can be split up to
t→∗∆1s→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q.
It implies that for each qi, with i = 1, . . . , n, one has
qi = τ(pi). (18)
At this stage, s is of the form rσ since γ is dened for every position of r.
Now using (18) and the hypothesis iii), one has
t→∆0rσ→
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q)
q.
The TRS R being right-linear with NLV (l)∩Var(r) = ∅ for each rule l→r of R,
one can built a substitution µ : PosX (l) 7→ T (F) such that:
•
For p ∈ PosVar(r)(l), one can set µ(p) = t
′
and t′ = t|p′ with p
′ ∈ Pos{l|p}(r).
Moreover, since l|p /∈ NLV (l), one obtains µ(p) = t
′→∗∆0σ(p).
•
For p ∈ PosVar(l)\Var(r)(l), one can proceed in the following way:
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· if l(p) ∈ NLV (l) then one can set µ(p′1), . . . , µ(p
′
1) to t
′
where t′ ∈ L(A0, σ(p
′
1))∩
... ∩ L(A0, σ(p
′
n)) with {p
′
1, . . . , p
′
n} = Pos{l(p)}(l).
· Otherwise, one can set µ(p) to a term t′ ∈ L(A0, σ(p)).
By this way, there exists t0 = lµ ∈ T (F) such that t0→
∗
A0
q and t0→Rt, proving
the lemma.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let Pn be the following proposition:
For all t ∈ L(Cγ(A0)), if there exists a function τ from Pos(t) to Q such that τ(ε) =
qf and for all p ∈ Pos(t),
t|p→
∗
Cγ(A0)
τ(p) and t[τ(p)]p→
∗
Cγ(A0)
qf
and such that
|{p ∈ Pos(t) | τ(p) ∈ Q0 ∧ t|p 6 →
∗
A0τ(p)}| = n,
then t ∈ R∗(L(A0)).
We prove that Pn is true for all n ≥ 0 by induction on n. To simplify notations,
let
NR(t, τ) = {p ∈ Pos(t) | τ(p) ∈ Q0 and t|p 6 →
∗
A0τ(p)}.
P0 : Assume that t and τ satisfy the hypothesis on P0. We have |NR(t, τ)| = 0. In
particular, ε 6∈ NR(t, τ). So, t = t|ε→A0τ(ε) = qf . Since A0 and Cγ(A0) have the
same set of nal states, t ∈ L(A0).
Pn =⇒ Pn+1: Assume that Pn is true for n ≥ 0 and that t and τ satisfy the hypothesis on
Pn+1. Since NR(t, τ) is non-empty, let p be a maximal element of NR(t, τ) (for
the lexicographical order). Then, by maximality of p, one can apply Lemma 3.1
to t|p. Thus, there exists t0 ∈ T (F) such that t0→
∗
A0
τ(p) and t0→Rtp. Therefore,
there exists a function τ1 from Pos(t0) into Q0 such that for all p
′
, t0→
∗
A0
τ1(p
′
),
t[τ1(p
′
)]p′→
∗
Cγ (A0)
τ(p). We dene the function τ2 from Pos(t[t0]p) to Q as follows.
· If p is not a prex of p
′
, then τ2(p
′
) = τ(p
′
),
· Otherwise, if p
′
is of the form p.u, then τ2(p
′
) = τ1(u).
By construction, t[t0]p→Rt and |NR(t[t0]p, τ2)| = n − 1. Thus, by induction,
t ∈ R∗(L(A0)).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
By denition C
(n+1)
γ (A0) = gγ(C
(n)
γ (A0))). Consequently, the set of transitions
of C
(n)
γ (A0) is included in the transitions set of C
(n+1)
γ (A0). Thus L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆
L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)).
Now, using a Lemma 2 of [4] leading to Theorem 2.6, one has for all n ≥ 1,
R(L(C(n)γ (A0))) ⊆ L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)).
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Consequently, by a direct induction,
R≤n(L(A0)) ⊆ L(C
(n+1)
γ (A0)).
It implies that
R∗(L(A0)) ⊆
⋃
n≥0
L(C(n)γ (A0)).
One can prove that for all n ∈ N, L(C
(n)
γ (A0)) ⊆ R
∗(L(A0)) by a direct induction
on n using Theorem 3.2, and we are done.
9 TA4SP Description
The TA4SP
4
tool, whose method is detailed in [3], is one of the four ocial tools of the
AVISPA tool-set [1]. A version of TA4SP without xored extensions is freely available
within the AVISPA toolset at http://www.avispa-project.org. The main partic-
ularity of this tool is the ability for verifying secrecy properties for an unbounded
number of sessions.
The structure of the TA4SP tool is detailed in Fig. 1.
TA4SP
TIMBUK
IF2TIF
SAFE / FLAWED / DON'T KNOW
IF Specication
tree automaton + secret terms
+ approximation function
Figure 1. TA4SP tool
The language IF is a low level specication language automatically generated from
the HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specication Language) [7] in the AVISPA toolset.
The TA4SP tool is made up of:
•
IF2TIF, a translator from IF to a specication well-adapted to TIMBUK+, and
•
TIMBUK+,
5
a collection of tools for achieving proofs of reachability over term rewrit-
ing systems and for manipulating tree automata. This tool has been initially de-
4
A distribution of the TA4SP tool will be soon available at http://www.irisa.fr/lande/boichut/ta4sp.html.
5
Timbuk is available at http://www.irisa.fr/lande/genet/timbuk/.
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veloped by Th. Genet (IRISA/ INRIA-Rennes, FRANCE) and enhanced in order
to handle our approximation functions.
Note that the tool TA4SP may also answer FLAWED while performing under-
approximations.
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